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NEW DIRECTIONS IN MARITIME STRATEGY?
Implications for the U.S. Navy
Geoffrey Till

G

lobalization, with its impact on the strategic environment, is the central fact
of the early twenty-first century. Some, in the traditions of the nineteenthcentury Manchester School, welcome it as ushering in an era of peace and plenty
by replacing competitive, aggressive balance-of-power politics with a much
greater sense of international community. Others see globalization as undermining their ways of life, their independence, their beliefs, and their future prospects. Still others dispute assumptions of globalization’s assumed longevity and
worry, on the contrary, about its prospective, if not imminent, collapse. Either
way, the present and future state of globalization will be a major determinant of
the shape and nature of world politics, and governGeoffrey Till is professor of maritime studies in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, and
mental attitudes to it will in turn be major determinants
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of strategy and of defense and naval policy.
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of a “borderless world,” in which the autarchy of the
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national units of which it is composed is gradually
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too. In a globalizing world, systems thinking pulls
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strategists forward geographically. This forward-leaning approach to the making and implementation of strategy has been a marked characteristic of European and American defense thinking for a decade now. Thus Tony Blair in early
2007: “The frontiers of our security no longer stop at the Channel. What happens
in the Middle East affects us. . . . The new frontiers for our security are global.
Our Armed Forces will be deployed in the lands of other nations far from home,
with no immediate threat to our territory, in environments and in ways unfamil1
iar to them.”
Second, globalization is a dynamic system, since, among other things, trade
and business produce a constantly changing hierarchy of winners and losers,
and because, historically, conflict seems to be particularly associated with eco2
nomic volatility. New players in the game have to be accommodated, its victims
supported, and future directions anticipated. The defense of the system has
therefore to be constant and proactive, rather than merely intermittent and reactive. This calls for continuous action along all the diplomatic, economic, social,
and military lines of development, with the latter’s requirements based on the
need to “shape the international security environment.”
Third, globalization depends absolutely on the free flow of trade—and this
goes largely by sea. For this reason alone, seapower is at the heart of the globalization process in a way that land and air power are not. This provides both an opportunity and a challenge, not least because sea-based globalization is potentially
vulnerable to disruption. In itself, this is not new, for Mahan warned us of it over a
century ago: “This, with the vast increase in rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting together the interests of nations to one
another, till the whole now forms an articulated system not only of prodigious size
3
and activity, but of excessive sensitiveness, unequaled in former ages.”
The “excessive sensitiveness” that Mahan had in mind derives from the fact
that interdependence, and indeed dependency of any sort, inevitably produces
targets for the malign to attack. But there is special point in his warnings now,
partly because the extraordinary extent and depth of today’s version of globalization depend on a supply-chain philosophy of “just enough, just in time” that
increases the system’s vulnerability to disruption. Moreover, there have emerged
various groups and situations that could exploit or exacerbate that increased
vulnerability. Such threats include, obviously, direct attack by groups or states
hostile to the values and outcomes that the system encourages. Less obviously,
international maritime crime in its manifold forms (piracy, drugs, and people
smuggling) and the unsustainable plundering of marine resources all threaten
to undermine the good order on which the safe and timely passage of shipping
depends. Conflict and instability ashore, moreover, can have disruptive effects in
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neighboring seas, as was demonstrated all too clearly in the Tanker War of the
1980s, for example.
The protective function of naval activity will plainly be a significant part of
any defensive response, because so many of these threats to the system can, and
do, take a maritime form or have important maritime consequences and require
maritime responses. Indeed, the Tanker War just mentioned is a particularly
clear example of the many ways in which navies “protect the system,” both directly by what they do at sea and indirectly by what they do from it. Identifying,
prioritizing, and preparing, from among the range of possible naval responses,
the platforms, weapons, and skill sets that will realize those responses are the
chief tasks of today’s naval planners. To repeat the point made earlier, many of
these requirements are bound to pull sailors forward, geographically. This
should not be news to sailors, since a forward-leaning policy was a characteristic
of Pax Britannica—the last great age of globalization. Thus:
Britannia needs no bulwarks
No towers along the steep;
Her march is o’er the mountain waves,
4
Her home is on the deep.
The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of
the spectrum of conflict, a range that seems to be getting ever wider. The resultant strategies are a blend of cooperative and competitive approaches in policy,
since the two are no more mutually exclusive in maritime-strategy making than
they are in international political life. Such strategies need to produce a range of
outcomes, or “deliverables.”
FOUR NAVAL NECESSITIES FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD
Perhaps four mutually dependent, key, and closely related deliverables can be
identified as being required. The first of these is a somewhat reformulated concept of sea control. Several things need to be said about this. First, sea control in
broad principle remains what it has always been—the grand enabler that allows
the sea to be used for whatever purpose will serve the interests of the power that
controls it. It therefore remains at the heart of maritime strategy. But in a globalized world it is less a question of “securing” the sea in the sense of appropriating
it for one’s own use, and more of “making it secure” for everyone but the enemies of the system to use. This is clearly aligned with the notion that “freedom of
navigation” is a universal requirement, if not a universal right, and ideally
should not be restricted to particular flags or cargoes. The language and the
rhetoric of maritime strategy need to be taken a step farther away from older,
more exclusive concepts of the “command” of the sea.
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Such sea control operations are most likely to be taking place in littoral regions (where the threats are rather different from, and at least as challenging as,
those encountered on the open ocean). Moreover, the likelihood that such campaigns take place in the course of wars of choice rather than of necessity makes
the “force protection” variant of sea control peculiarly apposite. There is ample
evidence that contemporary domestic opinion and—perhaps especially—an
intrusive and unsympathetic media will not bear the level of attrition common,
for example, in Britain’s system-defense wars of the nineteenth century in what
5
was later known as the third world. Sustainable system defense in the
twenty-first century depends on the maintenance of high levels of security for
the peacekeepers themselves. This is as true for sailors operating off the coast as
it is for soldiers in the streets of Basra or Baghdad.
In the post–Cold War period there has developed a concept of liberal interventionism in defense of the system, a concept based on the notion that if we do
6
not go to the crisis, the crisis will come to us. Best of all is to be there already,
preventing the crisis from arising in the first place. “The emphasis on expeditionary operations,” explains the British Ministry of Defence, “has enabled the
7
UK to have a key role in shaping the international security environment.” This
kind of thinking has resulted in Europe and the United States, and a perhaps surprising number of countries in South America and the Asia-Pacific as well, in a
strong focus on expeditionary operations, the second of our four naval necessities. Navies have switched their focus away, to some extent, from what they do at
sea to what they can do from it. But in the second of these they implicitly acknowledge the fact that disorder at sea is most often the consequence of disorder
on land and that, in consequence, naval activity conducted purely at sea usually
deals with the symptoms of the problem rather than its causes. It is when they
have an impact on events ashore that navies are at their most significant,
strategically.
Power projection in an expeditionary mode can therefore be seen as a defense
of the trading system against the instabilities and threats ashore that might arise.
These potential threats include rogue states, inter- or intrastate conflict, and the
malign effects of a host of newly empowered nonstate actors. In certain circumstances these can all threaten the health of the global sea-based system.
In earlier ages, of course, defense of the trading system was based primarily on
the direct defense of shipping at sea. Mahan indeed famously observed, “The necessity of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping and disappears
with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps
8
up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.” But nowadays the
defense of the immediate political and strategic conditions that make beneficial
trading possible has taken its place in naval priorities. There remain sea-based
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threats to the trading system, of course, and these will still need to be dealt with,
but in the postmodern world they no longer command the attention they did in
Mahan’s day. Instead the system is largely defended by collective expeditionary
action against threats ashore.
The current focus on the apparently unending land phase in Afghanistan and
Iraq, however, poses a number of real challenges for the navies of the participants. In the short term these conflicts absorb funds and resources that might
9
otherwise go to navies. The tyranny of the immediate commitment is certainly
a factor in the longer-term budgetary embarrassments of the U.S., British, and
10
several European navies.
Politically, the costs and disappointment of both campaigns seem likely to
make similar forays elsewhere less likely. On the face of it, this could undermine
the case for developing expeditionary capabilities. Since expeditionary assumptions underlie, even justify, many of the major acquisitions of Western navies (in
the shape of aircraft carriers, amphibious forces, and so forth), this would seem
to be serious news for sailors. On the other hand, the limited liability implied by
purely sea-based responses to instabilities ashore may commend more “maritime” conceptions of intervention to politicians, who may be more anxious to
avoid casualties and messy long-term commitments ashore.
This vision of a more sea-based conception of expeditionary operations, with
much less emphasis given to the commitment of land forces ashore, comes close
to the notion of good order from the sea. Either way, the future shape of expeditionary operations and a country’s prospective willingness to participate in
them will clearly be further major determinants of naval policy in the United
States and elsewhere.
The interest that is so evident in the United States, Europe, and parts of the
Asia-Pacific in the kind of sea basing that underpins expeditionary operations is
11
an obvious manifestation of this. Given the constraints of resources common
to navies in what used to be called “the West” and the developing gap between
these resources and the range of possible commitments, it seems to make sense
for such cooperative navies implicitly to accept a degree of specialization and a
“contributory” ethos in the preparation for, and conduct of, expeditionary operations. They do not expect to cover all the colors of the naval rainbow, but, ideally, they remain confident that those they do not, someone else, equally reliable,
will. They may not welcome this development or the degree of reliance on allies
that it implies, but in the face of budgetary realities they accept its inevitability.
Accordingly, less stress is placed on the maintenance of a “balanced fleet” or, indeed, of an indigenous maritime industrial base. This pragmatic approach fits
nicely into the conceptions of an interdependent, borderless world and an open
economy—conceptions that lie at the very heart of globalization.
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Globalization prospers when trade is mutually beneficial and takes place in
conditions of order, both on land and at sea. But as the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy
says, a variety of threats to good order at sea, our third naval necessity, imperil this:
Weak coastal states often are not able to regulate or provide protection for the legitimate movement and safety of vessels within their waters. They are frequently
ill-prepared to safeguard their maritime commerce and energy infrastructure, or
protect their marine resources from illegal exploitation and environmental damage.
Combined these vulnerabilities not only threaten their population, resources, and
economic development, but can threaten the security of the maritime commons
and even the continuity of global commerce.12

Such threats need to be taken seriously and almost certainly need to be taken
separately. It is probably a mistake to conflate maritime terrorism with piracy,
for example; the diseases are different, and so are the cures. But one unifying requirement of them all is the need for maritime domain awareness (MDA) systems that provide the necessary information in a timely and useful manner to
the people who need it. This in turn demands systems that are continuous in
time, substance, and space rather than sporadic, since the essential thing is to
pick up what is normal in order to identify the “abnormal.” MDA, in short, is a
permanent requirement that, ideally, should monitor all civilian activity on the
entire world ocean. An emerging issue is whether it will eventually monitor naval activity too.
Good order at sea will contribute to maritime security and the defense of the
homeland, and globalization means that this is bound to have its “home” and
“away” dimensions. Forward operations conducted in defense of the global system can be seen as defense in depth of the homeland. In a borderless world, for
example, cargo-container security begins, and may be at its most manageable, in
foreign ports—another example of the way in which globalization requires maritime strategy to be “forward leaning.” Here is the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy again:
The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is integral to the global system of trade. Securing the maritime border is an international activity that requires
pushing the nation’s layers of border security far away from its shores—through U.S.
waters, onto a well-governed ocean commons, then seamlessly joining the secure
maritime domain of foreign partners. It also requires extensive partnerships that integrate and build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector
13
stakeholders around the world.

The maintenance of good order at sea may be down in the “softer,” more constabulary end of the spectrum of required maritime capability in defense of the
system. For all that, it is a crucial enabler in global peace and security and therefore something that should command the attention of naval planners
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everywhere. Where navies are, in all but name, coast guards, this raises few issues, but it certainly raises them for those planners of larger navies grappling
with the allocation of resources between the hard and soft variants of maritime
security.
Here the essential question is the balance to be struck between coast guard
functions and forces, on one hand, and conventional naval ones, on the other.
Should navies absorb these functions or hive them off to specialized forces specifically designed for the purpose? There are arguments either way, but there is
little doubt that the function itself is important and becoming increasingly so.
This is especially the case when dealing with threats that shade into the strategic
area, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
environmental degradation. But since piracy, fishing disputes, and illegal immigration can feed, as well as reflect, disorder ashore, navies too have strong defense interests here.
Much of this requires the close cooperation, if not the integration, of all the
respective maritime agencies of as many countries as can be persuaded to cooperate. Knowledge is indeed power. This brings us to the fourth naval necessity
in the defense of the system, namely the maintenance of a maritime consensus. A
great deal has been written about “commanding the global commons,” by which
14
is usually meant the sea and the air and space above it. But people are the biggest “commons” of all, and securing their support is probably the single most
crucial requirement for the defense of the system. Commanding the human
commons provides such a level of military and political advantage that it must
surely be regarded as the “key enabler of the U.S. global power position.” Accordingly it is hard to exaggerate the importance of this battle for world opinion,
whether it finds expression in the parliaments of allies, the editorials of the
Washington Post, or the streets of the Middle East.
The perpetrators of 9/11 were not arguing for a bigger slice of the cake—they
were trying to blow up the bakery, because they thought globalization inherently
inimical to their aspirations. Notwithstanding, they are half-supported by huge
numbers of people who do want a bigger slice of the cake and who need to be
persuaded away from that support by the assurance of a system that seems fairer
to them—hence the importance of the political, social, and economic lines of
development, in which naval forces are of particular utility given their flexibility
and ubiquity. A forward and sensitive maritime presence can help not only deter
malefactors from malign actions or compel them into benign ones but also provide a means of signaling interest in a region’s affairs, monitoring events at sea
and ashore, and contributing to the development of a sense of international
community through a policy of active coalition building. The guiding principle

Published by C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC
U.S. Naval War College
2007
Review Digital
Autumn Commons,
2007.vp
Thursday, September 13, 2007 3:41:14 PM

7

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 4, Art. 5
36

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

throughout is that so long as national objectives are preserved, preventing war is
always better than winning it.
This being so, the benign applications of seapower have particular salience in
broader operations intended to defend the system through the winning of the
15
hearts and minds of the populations on which it ultimately depends. The notion of the “global fleet station” and the purposeful use of sustained cruises by
hospital ships like the USS Mercy and Comfort, and other such humanitarian re16
lief operations, fit the bill exactly. In other circumstances, of course, coercive
deployments of carrier battle groups off potentially hostile coasts may be more
appropriate. Either way, naval diplomacy requires the closest coordination between navies and their foreign ministries.
Many of these ideas are subsumed within the concept of the “thousand-ship
navy.” This is certainly a snappy and memorable title, but it is unfortunate for its
apparent exclusion of the coast-guard forces, which collectively have a huge role
to play in this concept. Moreover, folk memories of the “six-hundred-ship navy”
aspirations of the Ronald Reagan era make some think of it as simply another
U.S. Navy budgetary demarche. Finally, the term “navy” immediately sets up
connotations of hierarchy and leads to the question, “Who’s in charge?” Concerns of this sort may make the idea harder to sell to other navies. On the other
hand, the notion of an informal maritime coalition acting in concert against a
host of common threats to common interests is an attractive and persuasive one
17
that commands wide support. Phrases such as “global maritime partnerships”
may not have quite the zing of the “thousand-ship navy,” but in the long run they
may sell better, because they make it clearer that what is envisaged is maritime
forces effectively “policing” the system, with everyone contributing as they wish,
as and when they can. Encouraging the currently doubtful to participate and
facilitating this, where necessary with deliberate and sensitive campaigns of
capability building, must be a high priority. What is called for, and indeed appears to be happening, is a “conversation” conducted by the U.S. Navy with the
rest of the world, a conversation that does not necessarily have to end up with
the Navy always acting as the sheriff in a host of maritime posses.
Indeed, the tsunami relief operation of 2004 in many ways shows the thousandship navy concept in action, since this very necessary task was successfully performed by a loose coalition of the willing that got together, at very short notice,
outside fixed agreements, with no one “in charge.” The international rescue effort from Lebanon last year was much the same. Both were made possible by the
participating navies’ habit of working together.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY?
So, to sum up, what should all of this mean for the service? Plainly, the most obvious thing to be said is that future American foreign policy will provide the
framework that determines what the Navy can or cannot do. But assuming that
in broad terms the United States continues to focus on a program of liberal interventionism designed to defend the system, there should be a major focus on the
higher, more intense end of the spectrum of conflict, simply because no one else
can do it as well, or as much, as can the U.S. Navy. Hence the need for a continuing accent on quality in sea control operations and power projection, even if this
does result in a drop in quantity, as measured by the number of platforms available. It is important for the Navy to stay ahead of the game in the manifold disciplines it lists under the headings of “Sea Strike” and “Sea Shield.” This should
provide increased operational advantage over prospective adversaries, in the
shape of greater effectiveness, accuracy, and discrimination in the use of force
and of greater levels of force protection for all campaign participants. The result
will be increased confidence among political decision makers at times of strain,
something that may well be even more important in the wake of the experience
of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The snag is that this may well sustain, if not strengthen, a strategic culture of
resolute preeminence at all costs that was certainly appropriate in the twentieth
century, when peer competition with other major naval powers was the order of
the day, but that may be less appropriate in the globalizing world of the
twenty-first century. Such aspirations for strategic dominance may unsuit the
Navy for significant contributions at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict,
while feeding the prejudices of those who complain of the malign effects of a
U.S.-dominated unipolar world.
Moreover, these aspirations come at a level of economic cost likely to prove
increasingly burdensome in the future, perhaps unnecessarily so. Given the
emerging littoral environment in which these operations are likely to take place,
less powerful allies have much to offer—in, for example, the operation of SSKs
(i.e., diesel-powered hunter-killer submarines), mine warfare, the insertion of
special forces, and limited power-projection operations. Such operational and
budgetary considerations would seem to reinforce the political benefits of a U.S.
Navy approach that is as “inclusive” as physically possible to the practice of the
most demanding aspects of naval business. For all these reasons, the more “exclusive” American seapower is, the less likely it is to be strategically effective in
the long run.
The positive encouragement of allied participation in all manner of maritime
operations calls for a focused, deliberate, and intelligent maritime assault on all
the things that make this difficult at the moment. Interoperability is key. This is

Published by C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC
U.S. Naval War College
2007
Review Digital
Autumn Commons,
2007.vp
Thursday, September 13, 2007 3:41:14 PM

9

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 4, Art. 5
38

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

partly a matter of shared technical proficiency, which is ultimately “fixable,” and
18
also of protocols and standard operating procedures. The American tendency
19
to overclassify everything does not help. Policy divergences with coalition partners may be even less tractable. Overall, such difficulties may be real and based
on hard experience or imagined and merely the kind of general wariness toward
giants that “little guys” might be expected to display.
The maintenance of a permanent forward presence in critical areas should
provide the means to increase interoperability through near-continuous combined action with partners. The most critical area for this at the moment is what
has been described as the “supercomplex” that stretches from the Gulf to the
20
Northeast Pacific but “goes light” in the middle around Southeast Asia. With
its increasing industrial base, merchant shipping traffic, and port facilities, this
area is rapidly becoming the center of gravity of the world globalization system.
This is not to say that areas such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean, or the
Caribbean are not important but merely to suggest that at the moment their
problems and issues can be handled mostly by regional forces acting in concert,
with the U.S. Navy benignly in the background. Africa, indeed, is likely to be of
increasing importance, but the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific will none21
theless remain, collectively, the major focus for the time being.
The range of requirements also calls for the strongest possible integration of
the naval effort with other forces of maritime order—in the American case,
most obviously the Coast Guard. Often, indeed, as both the Japanese and the
Americans discovered in the Straits of Malacca, coast-guard forces will provide
far more appropriate responses to developing situations, responses that may
well be able to head off the need for more forceful interventions later on.
Coast-guard forces have much to offer a unified and integrated maritime
strategy, because the increasing value of the resources to be found in the exclusive economic zones provides governments around the world with very real economic incentives to make use of U.S. Coast Guard expertise. The U.S. Coast
Guard is a unique organization, unlikely to be replicated anywhere else; nonetheless, it has much to offer in the way of advice on many aspects of maritime security that can be adopted or adapted by anyone else—and it can make that
advice available in a manner that represents absolutely no threat to the sover22
eignty of others. By doing so, it indirectly defends the system, while at the same
time serving American national interests and contributing to the maritime outreach of the United States. Much of this, of course, depends on its not being seen
as the U.S. Navy. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard does not have the ships and the
personnel to establish a presence all round the world, and its global effectiveness
rests in significant degree on its symbiotic relationship with the Navy.
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To a lesser extent the same applies when it comes to security nearer home,
where strong naval forces clearly provide reserve capacities for the civil power
that will normally be exercised by constabulary forces. In many ways, therefore,
the closer the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy the better,
provided, of course, that the essential differences between the two are preserved
as well.
Underpinning much of this in the Navy should perhaps be a sense of humility—
for however effective hard naval power may be, it remains but part of the military line of development, and that in turn is only part of the broader range of
softer, political, diplomatic, and economic power needed to defend the system.
The success of the “smiling diplomacy” of China in reversing stereotypes of its
intentions in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is a timely reminder of the fact that
hard power is at its most effective when used with restraint—at least in situations short of all-out conflict.
But this sense of humility should not be pushed so far that “the naval case” is
not explained sufficiently well and sufficiently fully to publics and decision makers, especially given the tight margins within which the services all operate. One
requirement will presumably be to ensure that any “naval” strategy and policy
also becomes “national” and so secures the resources necessary for it to achieve
its purposes. For this approach to be accepted, naval policy certainly will need
meshing-in with foreign policy. In the early twentieth century the U.S. Marines
were sometimes considered “State Department troops,” and to the benefit of
both. Nowadays, the same might well need to apply to the whole of the maritime
team.
BUT WILL GLOBALIZATION SURVIVE?
But this review of what might be called “postmodern” maritime defense presupposes a fundamental change in the nature of international politics. It assumes that we are indeed living “on the cusp of a new era . . . [one] plagued by
uncertainty and change and unrestricted warfare, an era of shifting global
threats and challenging new opportunities . . . that calls for new skill sets, deeper
23
partnerships, and mutual understanding.” It assumes that sea-based globalization will continue and that its defense remains at the heart of naval policy
around the world.
But the threats that globalization faces are serious and may prove fatal. It is
worth remembering that in many ways the world of the late nineteenth century
was, in its own terms, as globalized as ours is today but that the system collapsed
in the face of commercial rivalry, the discontent of the disadvantaged, and grow24
ing nationalism. In some ways, these problems were in fact a by-product of
globalization, especially in regard to the kind of inequality of benefit that bred
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nationalism. The result of this was a world war, which, as Niall Ferguson has
observed,
sank globalization—literally. Nearly thirteen million tons of shipping went to the
bottom of the sea as a result of German naval action, most of it by U-boats. International trade, investment and emigration all collapsed. In the war’s aftermath, revolutionary regimes arose that were fundamentally hostile to international economic
integration. Plans replaced the market; autarky and protection took the place of free
trade. Flows of goods diminished; flows of people and capital all but dried up.25

This is indeed a chilling historical example of the way in which war can, to
borrow Thomas Friedman’s phrase, “unflatten” the world. If it is indeed true
that “war and warfare will always be with us; war is a permanent feature of the
human condition,” then it is far from inconceivable that the same might happen
26
again.
Accordingly, the prudent naval planner might well feel the need to bear this
lesson of history in mind, especially given the fact that our kind of globalization
faces an extra range of threats (most obviously international terrorism, resource
depletion, and environmental degradation) that theirs did not. A Marxist might
even argue that all of this is a result of the “inherent contradictions” of global
27
capitalism and, accordingly, is historically inevitable.
Should this Marxist analysis be right and globalization either collapse or enter a period of terminal decline, we would face a bleaker, harder, much less communal world of increased levels of competition in which coercive military force
and power politics dominate the strategic horizon. We would have, in short, a
warlike future.
Current expectations seem to lie somewhere between these two future extremes, of secure globalization, on the one hand, and blood-chilling system collapse on the other, perhaps especially in the crucial Asia-Pacific “supercomplex”
area already alluded to. Although in many ways at the heart of the globalization
process, that area has been authoritatively described as “an exemplar of traditional regional security dynamics found largely in the military-political mode. . . .
Old fashioned concerns about power still dominate the security agenda of most
of the regional powers, and war remains a distinct, if constrained possibility.”28
“Realistic” assumptions may also focus on the sheer unpredictability of future
events, here as elsewhere. Who can really know what the future may bring?
Should we not guard against the consequences of our inability to predict? Naval
planning would be much affected by a drift in this direction, and for all these
reasons there is a persuasive argument that prudent planners should aim to keep
their powder dry in case it does.
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This suggests much more of a stress on going forward to the past, on preparing navies for action against other navies rather than largely on the prosecution
of collective expeditionary campaigns ashore. These latter may indeed become
much less frequent, as we have noted above. They are inspired by a sense of liberal interventionism that is not new but has waxed and waned in the past, according to the vagaries of politics and hard experience. In the last great era of
globalization, the British prime minister Lord Palmerston was inclined this way
because he thought that “liberalism . . . was far more likely than despotism to
produce governments stable, pacific and friendly to England and English trade.”
But he was challenged by Lord Melbourne, who argued that on the contrary,
such assisted powers “never take our advice . . . treat us with the utmost contempt and take every measure hostile to our interests; they are anxious to prove
29
that we have not the least influence on them.” Such interventions, in short,
would do no good. Instead the focus should be on the defense of national tranquility and on those who might threaten it directly. These issues come and go—
but they do come back again, it would seem.
In a world much less determined by the exigencies of a mutually dependent
community of production and consumption, the views of latter-day
Melbournes are likely to prevail. Naval preparations would then be framed by
analysis of what other possibly competitive navies are doing, and there would be
much more emphasis on more “Mahanian” concepts of sea control, along with
all the naval disciplines that contribute to the independence of action that this
implies. For the United States, China and its navy is the most-discussed prospective peer competitor that might need treating in this way. Other countries in this region may take a similar view or focus on their immediate neighbors instead—or,
indeed, as well. All this implies preparation for high-intensity “fleet versus fleet”
engagements, as Admiral Sergei Gorshkov used to call them. Relevant capacities
are expensive and probably optimized for open-ocean operations rather than
land attack. Weaponry and sensor mixes emphasize antisubmarine and antiair
warfare, antiship missiles, and so on. For the U.S. Navy this aspiration would
seem to suggest a need for strong, fully networked naval forces, centered on carrier battle groups, permanently forward in the major area of concern, and it
would also seem to reinforce the inclination toward the high-intensity end of the
spectrum, even if this does make cooperative action with allies more difficult.
Finally, such an approach also ultimately justifies the maintenance of nuclear
deterrent forces at sea and everything that goes with it.
All this suggests a preference for the maintenance of the traditional naval
fighting disciplines and a balanced, not a specialized, “contributory” fleet. A resolute defense of a secure indigenous maritime base, if necessary at the price of
industrial and commercial cooperation with allies, would also seem to make
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sense. The greater the extent to which this is part of a larger national policy to
close and defend the economy against external pressure, the more it would be at
variance with the free trade conceptions that underpin globalization. Most
30
countries feel such pressures to some extent.
There is, sadly, no denying that there are tensions between these two approaches in the development of maritime strategy and naval policy. Accordingly,
the U.S. Navy, like all the others, needs to make choices as to where the balance is
to be struck between them, unless it has the kind of resource base that would allow it to do both as much as it wants to. Given that a resource turnaround of this
scale is unlikely, a carefully judged twin-track approach against high-end, statecentric threats, on the one hand, and low-end, people-centered threats, on the
other, seems called for. The result could be a novel mix of different types of maritime (naval, marine, and coast guard) forces, in which numbers of platforms are
inevitably set against their quality. Although this is currently the subject of a
wide-ranging debate about a future maritime strategy for the United States, a
debate intended to help produce the answers, this is essentially a political decision that rests on political analysis of the state of the world, its likely future, and
the desired future role of the United States.
But here, perhaps, naval planners not only reflect international realities but
also mold them. They have an effect—and, indeed, that is surely the point of
having navies in the first place. Too much stress on the more competitive variants of naval policy might in some circumstances become something of a selffulfilling prophecy, as arguably it did in the days before the first and second
world wars. Demonizing China and its navy, for instance, is likely to produce just
the kind of Chinese navy the United States would not wish to see. That being so,
there is much to suggest a policy presumption in favor of the essentially cooperative defense of the sea-based globalized world system, if only from fear of the
darker, bleaker world that might succeed it.
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